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Abstract
The arm's length principle states that the transfer price between two associated enter-
prises should be the price that would be paid for similar goods in similar circumstances
by unrelated parties dealing at arm's length with each other. This paper examines the
eect of the arm's length principle on dynamic competition in imperfectly competitive
markets. It is shown that the arm's length principle renders tacit collusion more stable.
This is true whether rms have exclusive dealings with unrelated parties or compete
for the demand from unrelated parties.
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1 Introduction
Transfer prices are often used to record intra-rm transactions among various divisions
within the rm. On one hand, they generate information for measuring divisional perfor-
mance and provide the basis for management accounting. On the other hand, they aect
the rm's overall tax liability when divisions operate in multiple tax jurisdictions. These
twin roles of transfer pricing have been the focus of much research.1 When some divisions
of a rm face competition, research has further shown that transfer prices can also serve
strategic purposes (Alles and Datar, 1998; Zhao, 2000; Arya and Mittendorf, 2008). Typi-
cal reasoning for the strategic use of transfer pricing relies on the rm's ability to exercise
price discrimination: by charging transfer price to its own aliate that is dierent from
what the rm would charge unrelated buyers, the rm is able to improve the aliate's
competitive posture against the unrelated competitors.
In reality, the rm's ability to exercise such price discrimination may be limited by
the so-called arm's length principle (ALP, henceforth). The ALP, set out in Article 9 of
the OECD Model Tax Convention, states that the transfer price between two associated
enterprises should be the price that would be paid for similar goods in similar circumstances
by unrelated parties dealing at arm's length with each other. The ALP is adopted by
most countries around the world with only a few exceptions. In applying the ALP, most
jurisdictions consider a comparable uncontrolled price to be the most reliable indicator of
an arm's length price, and the failure to comply with the ALP may result in a penalty.2 The
main reason for the ALP is given in OECD (2009, p. 27): \[...] to provide broad parity of
tax treatment for multinational enterprises and independent enterprises. Because the ALP
puts associated and independent enterprises on a more equal footing for tax purposes, it
avoids the creation of tax advantages that would otherwise distort the relative competitive
positions of either type of entity."
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the ALP changes the nature of dynamic
competition in imperfectly competitive markets. Our main point is that the ALP renders
tacit collusion between rms more stable than when rms are not subject to the ALP.3 To
understand why, suppose there are two upstream rms each with its own downstream al-
1Examples of studies on the role of transfer prices for management accounting are Holmstrom and Tirole
(1991) and Anctil and Dutta (1999). Tax implications of transfer pricing are examined, for example, in
Gordon and Wilson (1986), Kant (1990), and Goolsbee and Maydew (2000). Studies that consider both
roles of transfer pricing include Elitzur and Mintz (1996), Sansing (1999), Smith (2002), Baldenius et al.
(2004), Hyde and Choe (2005), and Choe and Hyde (2007).
2See Choe and Hyde (2007) for discussions of the penalty and how the rm needs to factor this into
account in its transfer pricing policy.
3Shor and Chen (2009) show that multi-divisional rms can use transfer prices and decentralized orga-
nizational structure to coordinate onto tacit collusion. But they do not consider the eect of the ALP.
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iate and some unrelated downstream buyers. Upstream rms supply intermediate goods to
downstream buyers and we take the ALP to require that the price charged by an upstream
rm to unrelated buyers be equal to the upstream rm's internal transfer price. Thus the
ALP ensures a level-playing eld for the upstream rms' aliates and unrelated buyers. In
the absence of the ALP, it is optimal for the upstream rms to exercise price discrimination
to foreclose all unrelated downstream buyers, which transfers the upstream duopoly to the
downstream market. When upstream rms follow the ALP, however, they cannot foreclose
unrelated downstream buyers. This makes downstream competition tougher than without
the ALP, which in turn makes upstream competition tougher, and hence tacit collusion
more attractive. Moreover, total surplus under collusion is lower under the ALP, primarily
because the collusive wholesale price is higher under the ALP. Once again this is due to the
fact that the ALP compels upstream rms not to foreclose unrelated buyers. Our ndings
suggest that, while the ALP can ensure the level-playing eld for multinationals' aliates
and unrelated enterprises in a static setting, it can render tacit collusion more attractive
in a dynamic setting, which can further reduce welfare.
Two recent studies have also argued that adherence to the ALP may lead to distor-
tions that could reduce overall welfare. Devereux and Keuschnigg (2009) consider a model
in which multinationals procure intermediate goods oshore and assemble nal goods in
home country. They show that application of the ALP can distort a multinational's or-
ganizational choice between foreign direct investment and outsourcing. Specically, the
ALP can reduce nancial strength of a multinational's foreign aliates, which can lead the
multinational to choose outsourcing over foreign direct investment even if the latter can be
more valuable. Behrens et al. (2010) consider a model where a rm sells nal goods in a
foreign market either by establishing its own foreign subsidiary or through contracting with
independent distributors at arm's length. They show that the independent arm's length re-
lationship generates ineciency because of double marginalization and that application of
the ALP weakens the rm's incentives to establish its own foreign subsidiary. In sum, these
studies show how the ALP can aect the rm's choice of organizational structure, which
can have eciency implications. Our paper complements these studies by highlighting the
potentially anti-competitive eect of the ALP in a dynamic setting.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model
with two upstream rms where each upstream rm deals with an exclusive set of unrelated
downstream buyers. The basic model is analyzed in Section 3, where it is shown that
tacit collusion is more stable under the ALP than without it. Section 4 considers the case
where upstream rms compete for unrelated downstream buyers and shows that the ALP
continues to render more stability to tacit collusion. Section 5 concludes the paper.
3
2 The Model
Consider a vertically related market with two upstream rms indexed i = 1; 2. Each
upstream rm produces an intermediate good at constant marginal cost c, which it supplies
to its downstream aliate and other unrelated buyers in the downstream market. We
assume that one unit of intermediate good is converted to one unit of nal good at no
further cost,4 each upstream rm deals with at most n  1 unrelated downstream buyers,
and competition in the downstream market is a la Cournot. These assumptions allow us
to address the issue of tacit collusion in the most parsimonious way. We index downstream
rms by j whereby upstream rm 1 supplies to downstream rm j = 1, its own aliate, and
downstream rms j = 2; :::; n, unrelated buyers. Upstream rm 2 supplies to downstream
rm j = n + 1, its own aliate, and unrelated downstream buyers j = n + 2; :::; 2n.5
We denote the set of downstream rms by N = f1; :::; 2ng. The downstream market's
(inverse) demand is given by p = a   Y with a > c where Y := Pj2N yj and yj is the
quantity purchased by downstream rm j. The headquarters of each vertical structure is
located upstream and maximizes the total prot from its supply chain while the downstream
aliate maximizes its own prot. That the downstream aliate maximizes its own prot is
standard in the literature on transfer pricing; otherwise, the vertical structure is centralized
and the downstream aliate does not play any meaningful role.
For our discussion of tacit collusion, we consider an innitely repeated game where 
denotes the discount factor between periods. We examine the eect of  on the stability of
the collusion between the upstream rms on transfer prices. Along the punishment path,
the rms are assumed to use the grim trigger strategy as in Friedman (1971).6 In each
period, the two upstream rms independently and simultaneously set prices for their own
aliates and the unrelated buyers, which is followed by the downstream rms' choice of
quantity. Let wj be the price downstream rm j pays the relevant upstream rm. Thus
w1 is upstream rm 1's internal transfer price for its own aliate and wj is the price it
charges unrelated buyer j = 2; :::; n. Similarly wn+1 is upstream rm 2's internal transfer
price and wj is the price it charges unrelated buyer j = n+ 2; :::; 2n.
4Adding additional costs does not make any changes to our main point as long as they are linear in
quantity. Also we do not explicitly consider tax. But it is easy to see that our results continue to hold
insofar as both upstream rms face the same tax rate.
5In our main model, we consider the case where each upstream rm has exclusive dealings with n   1
additional unrelated buyers. In Section 4, we discuss the case where upstream rms cannot exclude any
unrelated buyer.
6Although this punishment strategy is not optimal (Abreu, 1988), we use it for simplicity and tractability.
Indeed many previous studies have adopted the grim trigger strategy when analyzing stability of agreements.
See, among others, Deneckere (1983), Chang (1991), Lambertini et al. (1998), and Maggi (1999).
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Given prices (w1; :::; w2n), downstream rm j chooses yj to maximize prot
7
j := (p  wj)yj = (a 
X
k2N
yk   wj)yj : (1)
Given the quantities (y1; :::; y2n) determined above, upstream rm 1 chooses (w1; :::; wn) to
maximize its consolidated prot
1 := (p  c)y1 +
nX
k=2
(wk   c)yk; (2)
and upstream rm 2 chooses (wn+1; :::; w2n) to maximize its consolidated prot
2 := (p  c)yn+1 +
2nX
k=n+2
(wk   c)yk: (3)
Note that the internal transfer prices disappear in the above consolidated prots since they
merely track internal transactions between the two aliated entities and, therefore, cancel
out upon consolidation.
As usual, we solve the game backwards. First, given (w1; :::; w2n), we nd Cournot equi-
librium quantities in the downstream market denoted by (y1; :::; y2n), and the equilibrium
price denoted by p. Let A be the set of downstream rms that are active in equilibrium.
That is, A := fj 2 N j yj > 0 given (w1; :::; w2n)g: Let nA be the cardinality of A. Then
it is easy to see that, for all j 2 A, we have
yj =
a+
P
k2Awk   (nA + 1)wj
nA + 1
; p =
a+
P
k2Awk
nA + 1
: (4)
Next we solve for each upstream rm's optimal prices given the above Cournot equilibrium.
However, the details of its pricing decision depend on whether or not it complies with the
ALP. If an upstream rm complies with the ALP, then its optimization problem is subject to
the constraint that it cannot charge dierent prices to unrelated buyers and its own aliate.
Of course, compliance with the ALP is the rm's choice in that violation of the principle
can result in a penalty that depends on the magnitude of non-compliance (Choe and Hyde,
2007). Since our main focus is on the eect of the ALP on tacit collusion, however, we do
not model this choice explicitly but focus on the two polar cases of compliance vis-a-vis
7As is typical in the transfer pricing literature (Arya and Mittendorf, 2008), we assume that downstream
rms observe all internal transfer prices before choosing their quantities.
5
non-compliance. Adding the penalty for non-compliance will complicate analysis at no
additional insight because the rm's decision to collude or deviate will depend sensitively
on the way the penalty is modelled.
3 Tacit Collusion and the ALP
In this section we analyze the stability of tacit collusion with or without the ALP. Since
rms are assumed to use the grim trigger strategy, three payos are relevant in each period:
the prot under tacit collusion superscripted by `C', the prot from deviation superscripted
by `D', and the prot during the competitive phase superscripted by `E'.
3.1 Outcomes under the ALP
In applying the ALP, most jurisdictions consider a comparable uncontrolled price to be the
most reliable indicator of an arm's length price. Since the comparable uncontrolled price
in our setting is the price the upstream rm charges unrelated buyers, we have, under the
ALP, w1 = wj for all j = 2; :::; n and wn+1 = wk for all k = n+2; :::; 2n. That all unrelated
buyers for each upstream rm face the same price is due to symmetry. Then we have
A = N in Cournot equilibrium and, from (??), y1 = yj = [a+nwn+1  (n+1)w1]=(2n+1)
for all j = 2; :::; n, yn+1 = yk = [a+ nw1   (n+ 1)wn+1]=(2n+ 1) for all k = n+ 2; :::; 2n,
and p = [a+ n(w1 +wn+1)]=(2n+ 1). Using the above and (??), we can derive upstream
rm 1's reaction function:
w1 =
(2n2   n  2)a+ n(n+ 1)(2n+ 1)c
2(n+ 1)(2n2   1) +
n(2n2   n  2)wn+1
2(n+ 1)(2n2   1) : (5)
As shown in (??) and noting that n  2, prices are strategic complements in this case since
rm cannot exclude unrelated buyers when they comply with the ALP. Because rms are
symmetric, we focus, without loss of generality, on upstream rm 1's problem and derive its
consolidated prot under collusion denoted by C1 , its consolidated prot from deviation
denoted by D1 , and its consolidated prot from competition denoted by 
E
1 .
First, the collusive price wC := w1 = wn+1 maximizes joint prot 1 +2, leading to
wC =
(2n2 + n  2)a+ n(2n+ 1)c
2(2n2 + n  1) :
The resulting prot from collusion, the prot of each unrelated rm, and the consumer
surplus are
C1 =
n2(a  c)2
4(n+ 1)(2n  1) ; j =
n2(a  c)2
4(n+ 1)2(2n  1)2 ; CS
C =
n4(a  c)2
2(n+ 1)2(2n  1)2 : (6)
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Second, we nd upstream rm 1's optimal deviation. Given w1 and wn+1 = w
C , the
quantity purchased by each downstream rm that deals with upstream rm 2 is
yn+1 =    = y2n =
2n(2n  1)w1   n(2n  3)a  n(2n+ 1)c
2(2n  1)(2n+ 1) :
We divide analysis into two cases. First, if upstream rm 1's choice of w1 is such that
yj > 0 for all j  n + 1, then we have A = N . The required condition in this case is
w1 > [(2n   3)a + (2n + 1)c]=(4n   2). Then upstream rm 1's optimal deviation can be
found from (??):
wD1 =
(2n2   n  2)(2n3 + 5n2   2)a+ n(2n+ 1)(6n3 + 5n2   2n  2)c
4(n+ 1)2(2n2   1)(2n  1) :
However, one can check that, given the above wD1 , we have y

j  0 for all j  n+ 1 except
when n = 2. Thus upstream rm 1's optimal deviation that retains the upstream duopoly,
hence A = N , is possible only when n = 2. In this case, we have wD1 = (34a+ 155c)=189.
Second, if upstream rm 1's choice of w1 is such that y

j  0 for all j  n+1, then we have
A = f1; :::; ng. Thus upstream rm 1's deviation in this case results in all the downstream
rms that deal with upstream rm 2 shutting down. The condition required for this case
is w1  [(2n  3)a+ (2n+ 1)c]=(4n  2). Then we have y1 =    = yn = (a  w1)=(n+ 1):
Plugging these into upstream rm 1's consolidated prot (??), one can show that the
prot is strictly increasing in w1 for all w1  [(2n   3)a + (2n + 1)c]=(4n   2). Therefore
upstream rm 1's optimal deviation in this case is obtained at the corner: wD1 = [(2n  
3)a + (2n + 1)c]=(4n   2): Summarizing the above, upstream rm 1's optimal deviation
retains the upstream duopoly when n = 2 but it monopolizes the upstream market when
n  3. Putting these together, upstream rm 1's optimal deviation is given by
wD1 =
8>><>>:
34a+ 155c
189
; n = 2;
(2n  3)a+ (2n+ 1)c
4n  2 ; n  3:
The resulting prot from deviation is
D1 =
8>><>>:
289(a  c)2
1701
; n = 2;
(2n+ 1)(2n3   n2   n+ 4)(a  c)2
4(n+ 1)2(2n  1)2 ; n  3:
(7)
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Third, when rms return to the competitive phase, Nash equilibrium price can be
calculated from (??):
wE :=
(2n2   n  2)a+ n(n+ 1)(2n+ 1)c
2n3 + 5n2   2 :
This leads to the prot from competition:
E1 =
n2(n+ 1)(2n2   1)(a  c)2
(2n3 + 5n2   2)2 : (8)
3.2 Outcomes without the ALP
When upstream rms are not subject to the ALP, it is optimal for them to use price
discrimination to exclude unrelated buyers and supply only to their aliates, hence A =
f1; n+ 1g. When unrelated buyers are excluded, downstream rm j's Cournot quantity is
yj = (a+ wi   2wj)=3; i 6= j and upstream rm 1's consolidated prot is 1 = (a  y1  
yn+1   c)y1. From this, upstream rm 1's reaction function is given by
w1 =
6c  a  wn+1
4
: (9)
Prices in this case are strategic substitutes as shown in (??). When unrelated buyers are
excluded, downstream Cournot competition is translated into upstream price competition.
This is the strategic eect of transfer price discussed, for example, in Zhao (2000), and
Arya and Mittendorf (2008). As before, we focus on upstream rm 1's problem and derive
its consolidated prot under collusion denoted by ^C1 , its consolidated prot from deviation
denoted by ^D1 , and its consolidated prot from competition denoted by ^
E
1 .
First, the collusive price w^C := w1 = wn+1 maximizes joint prot 1+2, which leads
to w^C = (a+ 3c)=4. The resulting prot and the consumer surplus are
^C1 =
(a  c)2
8
; C^SC =
(a  c)2
8
: (10)
Second, given wn+1 = w^
C = (a+3c)=4, upstream rm 1's optimal deviation can be derived
from (??), w^D1 := (21c  5a)=16, resulting in
^D1 =
25(a  c)2
128
: (11)
Third, when upstream rms return to the competitive phase, we can again use (??) to
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solve for equilibrium transfer prices, w^E := w1 = wn+1 = (6c  a)=5. This leads to
^E1 =
2(a  c)2
25
: (12)
3.3 Stability of tacit collusion
Following the literature on tacit collusion, we measure the stability of collusion by the
minimum discount factor that sustains collusion. Since rms are assumed to use the grim
trigger strategy, any deviation leads the game to the competitive phase perpetually there-
after. Thus tacit collusion is sustainable by the grim trigger strategy if and only if the
discounted payo from perpetual collusion is not smaller than the sum of one-o payo
from deviation and the discounted payo from competition thereafter. Under the ALP,
this condition is
C1
1    
D
1 +
E1
1   : (13)
Let  be the value of  that satises (??) with equality. That is,  = (D1  C1 )=(D1  
E1 ). Then tacit collusion is sustainable under the ALP for all   . From (??), (??),
and (??), we have
 =
8>><>>:
289
478
; n = 2;
(2n3 + 5n2   2)(2n4   n3   2n2 + n+ 1)
16n10 + 48n9 + 24n8   80n7   59n6 + 81n5 + 65n4   32n3   28n2 + 4n+ 4 ; n  3:
(14)
Similarly, let ^ = (^D1   ^C1 )=(^D1   ^E1 ) be the minimum discount factor that sustains
tacit collusion without the ALP. From (??), (??), and (??), we have
^ =
25
41
: (15)
Based on (??) and (??), one can show that ^ >  if and only if n 6= 3. Moreover when
n  3, it can be shown that  decreases monotonically as n increases. We summarize the
main result from this section below.
Proposition 1: Suppose each upstream rm supplies to its own downstream aliate and
n   1 additional unrelated downstream buyers that have exclusive dealings with each up-
stream rm. Then tacit collusion is more stable with the ALP than without it in all cases
except when n = 3. Moreover tacit collusion under the ALP becomes more stable as the
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number of unrelated downstream buyers increases.
We oer some intuition behind the above proposition. When upstream rms do not
comply with the ALP, they can foreclose all unrelated downstream buyers and enjoy
duopoly prots. This is independent of the number of unrelated downstream buyers. Com-
pliance with the ALP changes this, however. When upstream rms adhere to the ALP,
they cannot exclude unrelated downstream buyers. As the number of unrelated buyers
increases, downstream competition intensies, which is translated into tougher upstream
competition. It is easy to verify that the wholesale price from competition, wE , converges
to c as n increases. Thus as the number of unrelated downstream buyers increases, equi-
librium prot decreases, which makes collusion more attractive. Indeed it is routine to
check from (??) and (??) that C1 increases in n and 
E
1 decreases in n. Consequently,
the critical discount factor  = (D1   C1 )=(D1   E1 ) decreases in n. The situation is
illustrated in Figure 1.
| Figure 1 goes about here. |
Before we close this section, we briey discuss the eect of the ALP on welfare when
collusion is sustained. We measure welfare as total surplus, which is the sum of all rms'
prots and consumer surplus. Under the ALP, it can be calculated from (??) and, without
the ALP, from (??). It is easy to see that both consumer surplus and total surplus are
larger without the ALP. The main reason for this is that the collusive wholesale price is
higher under the ALP, as can be veried by comparing wC and w^C . When upstream rms
collude under the ALP, they continue to supply to unrelated buyers and, therefore, they do
not want to lower the collusive wholesale price too much as it also benets unrelated buyers.
Without the ALP, they do not face such a problem since they can foreclose all unrelated
buyers. Figure 2 shows total surplus and consumer surplus under collusion in the two cases.
| Figure 2 goes about here. |
4 When Unrelated Buyers Cannot Be Excluded
So far we have assumed that the relationship between each upstream rm and its unrelated
downstream buyers was exclusive. That is, unrelated downstream rms that purchase from
one upstream rm do not purchase from the other upstream rm. We now consider the case
where upstream rms cannot exclude unrelated downstream buyers, who purchase from
the upstream rm that charges lower price. Intuitively this makes upstream competition
10
tougher and collusion more attractive than the previous case. We show that the ALP
continues to make collusion more stable.
We modify our basic model slightly. There are two upstream rms, each with one
aliate downstream rm, and n   2 additional unrelated downstream rms. For i = 1; 2,
upstream rm i's downstream aliate is downstream rm i, and unrelated downstream
rms are indexed by j = 3; :::; n. Unrelated downstream rms choose the upstream rm
that charges lower price. But each downstream aliate purchases from its own upstream
aliate regardless of any price dierence. If upstream rms charge the same price, we
assume that they divide unrelated buyers' demand equally. All other elements of the
model are the same as before. Since the outcomes for the case without the ALP are the
same as before, we consider below only the case with the ALP.
Let wi be the wholesale prices set by upstream rm i, i = 1; 2. Under the ALP, w1
and w2 are oered to all unrelated downstream buyers, who choose the upstream rm with
lower price. Then we can derive upstream rm 1's consolidated prot function:
1 =
8>>>><>>>>:

a+(n 1)w2+w1
n+1   c

a+(n 1)w2 nw1
n+1

if w1 > w2;
a+nw1
n+1   c

a w1
n+1

+ (n 2)(w1 c)(a+w2 2w1)2(n+1) if w1 = w2;
a+(n 1)w1+w2
n+1   c

a+w2 2w1
n+1

+ (n 2)(w1 c)(a+w2 2w1)n+1 if w1 < w2:
(16)
Upstream rm 2's consolidated prot function can be written in a symmetric way.
As before, we solve for upstream rm 1's consolidated prot from collusion, deviation
and competition. First, the collusive price wC := w1 = w2 maximizes joint prot 1+2,
1 +2 =

a+ nw1
n+ 1
  c

2(a  w1)
n+ 1
+
(n  2)(w1   c)(a  w1)
n+ 1
which leads to
wC =
(n2 + n  4)a+ n(n+ 1)c
2(n  1)(n+ 2) :
The resulting prot is
C1 =
n2(a  c)2
8(n  1)(n+ 2) : (17)
Second, given w2 = w
C , upstream rm 1's optimal deviation should necessarily be
undercutting upstream rm 2's price. Thus it can be found from the third line in (??):
wD1 =
(n2   5)(3n2 + 3n  8)a+ (n+ 1)(5n3   17n+ 8)c
8(n  1)(n+ 2)(n2   3) :
11
However, given the above wD1 and w
C , one can show that upstream rm 2's downstream
aliate, i.e., downstream rm 2, purchases a positive quantity only when n  5. When
n  6, upstream rm 1's deviation leads to y2 = 0. The condition required for this
case is w1  [(n3   n2   6n + 4)a + n2(n + 1)c]=[2(n + 2)(n   1)2]. In this case, all the
remaining downstream rms' Cournot quantity is y1 = y3 =    = yn = (a   w1)=n:
Plugging these into upstream rm 1's consolidated prot, one can show that the prot is
strictly increasing in w1 for all w1  [(n3   n2   6n+ 4)a+ n2(n+ 1)c]=[2(n+ 2)(n  1)2].
Therefore upstream rm 1's optimal deviation in this case is obtained at the corner: wD1 =
[(n3 n2 6n+4)a+n2(n+1)c]=[2(n+2)(n 1)2]: Summarizing the above, rm 1's optimal
deviation retains the upstream duopoly when n  5 but it monopolizes the upstream
market when n  6. Putting these together, upstream rm 1's optimal deviation is given
by
wD1 =
8>>><>>>:
(n2   5)(3n2 + 3n  8)a+ (n+ 1)(5n3   17n+ 8)c
8(n  1)(n+ 2)(n2   3) ; n  5;
(n3   n2   6n+ 4)a+ n2(n+ 1)c
2(n+ 2)(n  1)2 ; n  6:
The resulting deviation prot is
D1 =
8>>><>>>:
(3n2 + 3n  8)2(a  c)2
32(n+ 2)2(n2   3) ; n  5;
n(n+ 1)(n4   2n3   4n2 + 11n  4)(a  c)2
4(n+ 2)2(n  1)4 ; n  6:
(18)
Third, when rms return to the competitive phase, we have Bertrand competition
since each upstream rm vies for unrelated downstream buyers (see 1 in (??) which
discontinuously changes around the neighbourhood of w1 = w2). Insofar as its price is
above marginal cost, each upstream rm has incentives to undercut each other. Only when
w1 = w2 = c, no upstream rm has an incentive to change its price. Thus equilibrium
price in the competitive phase is
wE := c;
and the resulting prot is
E1 =
(a  c)2
(n+ 1)2
: (19)
As before, let  = (D1   C1 )=(D1   E1 ). Then tacit collusion is more stable with
the ALP than without it if and only if  < ^ = 25=41. From (??), (??) and (??), one
can calculate  and verify that  < ^ = 25=41 for all n. Unlike the previous case,
however,  monotonically increases to 1/2 as n increases. This is because, when upstream
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rms compete for unrelated downstream buyers, deviation is more protable than when
the upstream-downstream relationship is exclusive. Nonetheless, tacit collusion is more
stable under the ALP than without it for any number of unrelated downstream buyers.
We summarize the main result from this section below.
Proposition 2: Suppose each upstream rm supplies to its own downstream aliate and
competes for additional unrelated downstream buyers. Then tacit collusion is more stable
with the ALP than without it for any number of unrelated downstream buyers.
Figure 3 compares various prots and the critical discount factors in the two cases un-
der the ALP. To compare them with equal number of downstream rms, we have chosen
the number of downstream rms in Section 4 to be 2n. Then prot from collusion is the
same in both cases. Not surprisingly, equilibrium prot is everywhere smaller and deviation
prot larger when upstream rms cannot exclude unrelated downstream buyers. Because
upstream competition is tougher when upstream rms compete for unrelated downstream
buyers, collusion is more attractive and the critical discount factor for collusion is smaller.
Thus the ALP continues to render more stability to tacit collusion.
| Figure 3 goes about here. |
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has examined how the ALP changes the nature of dynamic competition in
imperfectly competitive markets. Our main nding is that the ALP makes tacit collusion
between rms more stable than when rms are not subject to the ALP. The primary reason
for this is that the ALP compels the rm not to price-discriminate between its own aliates
and unrelated buyers. On the other hand, the rm can exclude unrelated buyers if it is not
subject to the ALP. Therefore the ALP makes competition tougher in the market where
the rm's aliates operate. This makes collusion more attractive. We have also shown that
total surplus under collusion is lower when rms comply with the ALP, mainly because the
collusive price is higher.
Our ndings stand counter to the original rationale of the arm's length principle. Al-
though the principle can ensure the level-playing eld for multinationals' aliates and
unrelated enterprises in a static setting, it can lead to anti-competitive outcomes in a
dynamic setting, which can further reduce welfare.
13
References
[1] Abreu, D. (1988), On the Theory of Innitely Repeated Games with Discounting.
Econometrica, 56(2), 383-396.
[2] Alles, M. and S. Datar (1998), Strategic Transfer Pricing.Management Science, 44(4),
451-461.
[3] Anctil, R. and S. Dutta (1999), Transfer Pricing, Decision Rights and Divisional versus
Firm-wide Performance Evaluation. The Accounting Review, 74(1), 87-104.
[4] Arya, A. and B. Mittendorf (2008), Pricing Internal Trade to Get a Leg Up on External
Rivals. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 17(3), 709-731.
[5] Baldenius, T., N. Melumad, and S. Reichelstein (2004), Integrating Managerial and
Tax Objectives in Transfer Pricing. The Accounting Review, 79(3), 591-615.
[6] Behrens. K., Peralta, S., and P. M. Picard (2010), Transfer Pricing Rules, OECD
Guidelines, and Market Distortions. CREA Discussion Paper Series 10-20, University
of Luxembourg.
[7] Chang, M.-H. (1991), The Eects of Product Dierentiation on Collusive Pricing.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 9(3), 453-469.
[8] Choe, C., and C. Hyde (2007), Multinational Transfer Pricing, Tax Arbitrage and the
Arm's Length Principle. Economic Record, 83(263), 398-404.
[9] Deneckere, R. (1983), Duopoly Supergames with Product Dierentiation. Economics
Letters, 11(1), 37-42.
[10] Devereux, M. P. and C. Keuschnigg (2009), The Distorting Arm's Length Principle.
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7375.
[11] Elitzur, R. and J. Mintz (1996), Transfer Pricing Rules and Corporate Tax Competi-
tion. Journal of Public Economics, 60, 401-422.
[12] Friedman, J.W. (1971), A Non-Cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames. Review of
Economic Studies, 38(1), 1-12.
[13] Goolsbee, A. and E. Maydew (2000), Coveting Thy Neighbor's Manufacturing: The
Dilemma of State Income Apportionment. Journal of Public Economics, 75, 125-143.
14
[14] Gordon, R. and J.D. Wilson (1986), An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate
Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment. Econometrica, 54(6), 1357-1373.
[15] Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole (1991), Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form. Jour-
nal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, 201-228.
[16] Hyde, C., and C. Choe (2005), Keeping Two Sets of Books: the Relationship between
Tax and Incentive Transfer Prices. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,
14(1), 165-186.
[17] Kant, C. (1990), Multinational Firms and Government Revenues. Journal of Public
Economics, 42, 135-147.
[18] Lambertini, L., S. Poddar, and D. Sasaki (1998), Standardization and the Stability of
Collusion. Economics Letters, 58(3), 303-310.
[19] Maggi, G. (1999), The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Coop-
eration. American Economic Review, 89(1), 190-214.
[20] OECD (2009), Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Ad-
ministrations. OECD Publications Service, Paris.
[21] Sansing, R. (1999), Relationship-Specic Investments and the Transfer Pricing Para-
dox. Review of Accounting Studies, 4, 119-134.
[22] Shor, M. and H. Chen (2009), Decentralization, Transfer Pricing, and Tacit Collusion.
Contemporary Accounting Research, 26(2), 581-604.
[23] Smith, M. (2002), Tax and Incentive Trade-Os in Multinational Transfer Pricing.
Journal of Accounting, Ausiting & Finance, 17(2), 209-236.
[24] Zhao, L. (2000), Decentralisation and Transfer Pricing under Oligopoly. Southern
Economic Journal, 67(2), 414-426.
15
4 6 8 10
n
0.112
0.114
0.116
0.118
0.120
0.122
0.124
P
C
Without the ALP
Under the ALP
2 4 6 8 10
n
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.20
0.21
0.22
0.23
0.24
P
D
Under the ALP
Without the ALP
Collusive prot Deviation prot
4 6 8 10
n
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
P
E
Under the ALP
Without the ALP
2 4 6 8 10
n
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
∆
*
Under the ALP
Without the ALP
Competitive phase prot Critical discount factor
Figure 1: Prots and Critical Discount Factors for Collusion
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Figure 2: Total Surplus and Consumer Surplus under Collusion
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Figure 3: Prots and Critical Discount Factors
in the Two Cases under the ALP.
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